This volume examines the conflicting factors that shape the content and form of grammatical rules in language, which speakers and addressees need to contend with when expressing themselves and when trying to comprehend messages. Chapters examine adult language, first and second language acquisition, and the motivations behind historical change.

The impact of emotion on executive functioning is gaining interest. It has led to the differentiation of “cool” Executive Functioning processes, such as cognitive flexibility, and “hot” EF processes, such as affective flexibility. But how does affective flexibility, the ability to switch between cognitive and affective information, vary as a function of age and sex? How does this construct relate to “cool” executive functioning and cognitive-emotion regulation processes? In this study, 266 participants, including 91 adolescents and 175 adults, completed a (...) cognitive–affective switching task with specific unpredictable switches, as well as measures of inhibition, attention, and cognitive-emotion coping strategies. We expected cognitive to affective switching to be more costly than affective to cognitive switching in females versus males, as well as higher switch costs in adolescents. Using linear mixed modelling, we analysed the effect of age, sex, and types of switching on reaction time. Results show that adolescents are slower switchers than adults, and demonstrate that females, although faster switchers than males, are slower when switching from cognitive to affective content than when they are switching from affective to cognitive content. Multiple regression analyses revealed age-specific associations between cognitive-affective switching and inhibition. These results converge with reported developmental and gender specificities in EF and emotion processing, respectively. Additionally, affective flexibility could relate to differences in vigilance and inhibition. (shrink)

Lives and work of Veṅkaṭanātha (Vedantadesika), 1268-1369, and Maṇavāḷa Māmun̲i, 1370-1444, Vaishnavite leaders and exponents of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school in Hindu philosophy from Tamil Nadu.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 139 twenty years ago has slowly given way to an awareness that cross-cultural differences are real enough to call for different rules of behavior and different sets of values. Several possibilities are still open to the ethicist concerned with the problem of relativism. We may want to reconsider more carefully than ever before the connotations of "relative," of "action" and of "culture" in the context of those (...) anthropologists whose claims are said to be detrimental to ethics. Of these terms so crucial for what Moser calls relativism of right, only the first has been analyzed from opposite perspectives by Stevenson and Berlin. So far as I know, no one has treated "relative" as a relational term in the fruitful way suggested by Berlin.19 We may also come to realize that the issue of relativism is too much imbedded in historical and metaphysical tenets and thus is not amenable to the ahistorical treatment of the logical status of moral judgment. Thus we may want to rewrite its whole history by exploiting one of the best facets of Moser's essay. That is, a comparative study of the sociology of knowledge with the organic model of cultural anthropology. Lastly we may agree with A. Edel and consider the whole issue a closed chapter in the history of philosophy, and move on to the philosophically more fruitful investigation of the why and wherefore of moral change between generations and between historical periods. L. M. PALMER University of Delaware Ernst Cassirer: Scientific Knowledge and the Concept of Man. By Seymour W. Itzkoff. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971. Pp. xi +286. $9.95) There is a sense in which the title of this book is misleading. To be sure, Dr. Itzkoff does deal with Cassirer and with Cassirer's neo-Kantian conception of scientific knowledge and of man. But there is more to the book than this. The first seven chapters are, in effect, a demonstration that "Cassirer left us with a difficult theoretical dilemma: the existence of two contrasting and opposed views of human nature" (p. 172). The last two chapters (pp. 172-252) are the author's attempt to bring those two views into harmony within the framework of contemporary science and philosophical analysis. The first two chapters (pp. 1-37) trace briefly the development of philosophical thought from the time of "the intellectual revolution set in motion by Galileo" to Kant's "Copernican revolution"--to the Kantian thesis, that is, that "the fundamental act of perception and the structuring of experience itseLf depend upon... 'transcendental apperception' as a 'condition of the possibility of perception itself'" (p. 27). It is the concern with "form and function" rather than with "substance and reality," which the Marburg neo-Kantians, and with them Cassirer, accepted as the lasting achievement of Kant's "critical philosophy." But Cassirer found in Kant also a "parallel concern... for humanistic disciplines" (p. 33) and, as "a central theme," the assertion of the "autonomy of human nature" (p. 35). The survey is suggestive but, in some respects, it is also inaccurate. For example, Kant's presumed "lapse into a radical subjectivism" cannot be justified by the reference, in passing, as it were, to the Opus postumum (p. 29)--although the fault is here perhaps that of Norman Kemp Smith rather than that of the author. A more ~o I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, 1969), pp. 96-106. 140 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY serious misrepresentation of Kant may be found in the author's acceptance of T. D. Weldon's statement that "the categories... supply principles which are... essential to the existing of a unitary self-consciousness" (p. 32), for this is precisely the reverse of the Kantian position. Also, it is hardly accurate to speak of "Kant's postulation of laws of ethical behavior" (p. 36), for, surely, the various formulations of the categorical imperative are not "laws of ethical behavior" but criteria of such laws. Chapters 3 and 4 (pp. 38-98) are devoted to discussions of the nature of scientific knowledge. Kant's initial commitment to Newtonian mechanics is, of course, a wellknown fact; but Professor Itzkoff quite correctly points out... (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought the live music industry to an abrupt halt; subsequently, musicians are looking for ways to replicate the live concert experience virtually. The present study sought to investigate differences in aesthetic judgments of a live concert vs. a recorded concert, and whether these responses vary based on congruence between musical artist and piece. Participants made continuous ratings of their felt pleasure either during a live concert or while viewing an audiovisual recorded version of the same joint (...) concert given by a university band and a United States Army band. Each band played two pieces: a United States patriotic piece and a non-patriotic piece. Results indicate that, on average, participants reported more pleasure while listening to pieces that were congruent, which did not vary based on live vs. lab listening context: listeners preferred patriotic music when played by the army band and non-patriotic music when played by the university band. Overall, these results indicate that felt pleasure in response to music may vary based on listener expectations of the musical artist, such that listeners prefer musical pieces that “fit” with the particular artist. When considering implications for concerts during the COVID-19 pandemic, our results indicate that listeners may experience similar degrees of pleasure even while viewing a recorded concert, suggesting that virtual concerts are a reasonable way to elicit pleasure from audiences when live performances are not possible. (shrink)

The novel coronavirus has not only brought along disruptions to daily socio-economic activities, but sickness and deaths due to its high contagion. With no widely acceptable pharmaceutical cure, the best form of prevention may be precautionary measures which will guide against infections and curb the spread of the disease. This study explored the relationship between COVID-19 knowledge, risk perception, and precautionary behavior among Nigerians. The study also sought to determine whether this relationship differed for men and women. A web-based cross-sectional (...) design approach was used to recruit 1,554 participants from all geopolitical zones in Nigeria, through social media platforms using a snowball sampling technique. Participants responded to web-based survey forms comprising demographic questions and adapted versions of the Ebola knowledge scale, SARS risk perception scale, and precautionary behavior scale. Moderated mediation analysis of the data showed that risk perception mediated the association between COVID-19 knowledge and precautionary behavior and this indirect effect was in turn moderated by gender. Results indicate that having adequate knowledge of COVID-19 was linked to higher involvement in precautionary behavior through risk perception for females but not for males. It was also noted that awareness campaigns and psychological intervention strategies on COVID-19 related activities may be particularly important for males more than females. Drawing from the health belief model, we recommend that COVID-19 awareness campaigns should target raising more awareness of the risks associated with the infection to make individuals engage more in precautionary behaviors. (shrink)

Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

The book is divided into three parts. The first criticizes in some detail the various naturalistic theories as they appear in philosophy and the sciences. Thus Professor Vivas reckons with the interest theory of Santayana and R. B. Perry, the postulational theory of Charner Perry, the instrumentalist theory of Dewey, the linguistic theory of Stevenson, and again, the cultural relativity of the anthropologists and the genetic account of conscience in Freud. Once these are demolished, the second part looks for the (...) generic structure of the moral experience as focussed in the process of resolving a moral perplexity. Professor Vivas stresses the role of a hierarchically organized system of values espoused by the self which constitutes the person, and repeatedly insists on the objective or "ontic" status of the values. The person is regarded as an axiological not a psychological category; and it is only through resolving moral perplexities that a man finds out, by creating, what he is. The creative element prevents moral decision from being simply self-expression. In fact, the ethical stage, as distinguished from the moral, is characterized by the overthrow of a man's dominant values: "when we repudiate our constitutive values altogether and forge an entirely new personality, a naked, empty self must do the choosing, and how this process is possible is not at all obvious". The third part presents the rise of the ethical attitude in this second birth. Its essence lies in the absolute sanctity of the person, and Professor Vivas sees this as the answer to the conflict of values in our time. (shrink)

TO the egoist the ultimate justification of his acts lies in their being conducive of his personal interest. This refusal to submit his own interests to any moral test beyond themselves in their interrelations and prospects of fulfillment makes the egoist the object of fierce attack. The non-egoist is supposed to be always ready to question the ultimacy of his own interests. Even where he pursues them, it is because on some other basis-general happiness or duty or anything else-he thinks (...) it right for a man in such circumstances to follow self-interest or give free play to inclination. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 6, June 2022.

A whole set of apprehensions blocks the relation of value theory to science. There is fear of a scientific authoritarianism in which a presumed scientific account of man's nature will dictate men's duties. There is a sensitive theoretical concern with the dangers of reductionism, the danger of sweeping aside the finer shades of human reactions that so far only phenomenological inspection has been able to reveal. There is the apprehension that causal inquiry will be substituted for responsible evaluative decision, or (...) that there may be helpless acquiescence in man's pitiful smallness instead of a sense of commitment and a stiffening of moral fibre. There is the danger too that the temporary character of many scientific hypotheses will be forgotten when they become the factual bases of ethical decisions. One cannot say that value theory which has spoken in the name of science has wholly avoided these dangerous pitfalls. But does not the avoidance of science in the realm of values have its own roster of dangers? Have not the dogmatisms of intuition, tradition, authority, been far more peremptory and far more arrogant in rejecting the need for evidence than a scientific dogmatism could ever be, hampered as it is by a built-in probabilism? Think of the many anxious beliefs about life and death that have taken the garb of certainty in issuing moral imperatives, or of arbitrary preferences unchecked in their universal pretensions. Recall the historical clinging to the familiar in a world that demands change, and the harsh striking down of the unconforming, the cramping effect on value creativity in all domains from art to morals. And what of the likelihood--if indeed there are scientific bases for value judgments--that turning the other way means simply making a faith out of outworn beliefs or yesterday's science rather than incorporating what is vital and growing in the expansion of human knowledge? One who would work in value theory has no other recourse than to appraise the relation of science and value in its own terms as a theoretical issue, and one of central importance. (shrink)

Résumé Après l’enthousiasme soulevé par le début des années 1990, les peuples autochtones de Sibérie ont dû relever de nombreux défis. Dans le nord-ouest sibérien, au-delà des associations qui militent pour la reconnaissance et les droits autochtones, des expériences individuelles ont vu le jour, qui chacune à leur façon, puisent dans la culture traditionnelle pour s’adapter au cadre complexe de la Fédération de Russie.

Sustained attention, a key cognitive skill that improves during childhood and adolescence, tends to be worse in some emotional and behavioural disorders. Sustained attention is typically studied in non-affective task contexts; here, we used a novel task to index performance in affective versus neutral contexts across adolescence (N = 465; ages 11–18). We asked whether: (i) performance would be worse in negative versus neutral task contexts; (ii) performance would improve with age; (iii) affective interference would be greater in younger adolescents; (...) (iv) adolescents at risk for depression and higher in anxiety would show overall worse performance; and (v) would show differential performance in negative contexts. Results indicated that participants performed more poorly in negative contexts and showed age-related performance improvements. Those at risk of depression performed more poorly than those at lower risk. However, there was no difference between groups as a result of affective context. For anxiety there was no difference in performance as a function of severity. However, those with higher anxiety showed less variance in their reaction times to negative stimuli than those with lower anxiety. One interpretation is that moderate levels of emotional arousal associated with anxiety make individuals less susceptible to the distracting effects of negative stimuli. (shrink)

English translation of the commentary on Tattvatrayam of Piḷḷai Lokācāryar, treatise on Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy.

The term “value” has a wide range of current usage in philospohy and the sciences. Descriptively, a man's “values” may refer to all his attitudes for-or-against anything. His values include his perferences and avoidances, his desire-objects and aversion-objects, his pleasure and pain tendencies, his goals, ideals, interests and disinterests, what he takes to be right and wrong, good and evil, beautiful and ugly, useful and useless, his approvals and disapprovals, his criteria of taste and standards of judgment, and so forth.

Words have determinable sense only within a complex of unstated assumptions, and all interpretation must therefore go beyond the given material. This book addresses what is man's place in the Aristotelian world. It also describes man's abilities and prospects in managing his life, and considers how far Aristotle's treatment of time and history licenses the sort of dynamic interpretation of his doctrines that have been given. The ontological model that explains much of Aristotle's conclusions and methods is one of life-worlds, (...) in which the material universe of scientific myth is no more than an abstraction from lived reality, not its transcendent ground. (shrink)

Chapter The Nature And Role Of Philosophy The word "Philosophy" means the love of wisdom. Any man, therefore, who seeks understanding is in spirit a ...